Dynamic Contracting
Abstract
Dynamic contracting plays a central role in many environments—for instance, in the sale of goods and services to consumers whose preferences evolve through learning, experimentation, or habit formation; in the taxation of workers whose productivity changes with learning-by-doing; in the provision of services on platforms with stochastic entry and exit of buyers and sellers; and in the matching of agents whose values and attractiveness are gradually revealed through past interactions. This article surveys several strands of the recent dynamic mechanism design literature, distills a few lessons, and points to promising directions for future research.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Auction Theory and Applications
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Annual Review of Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1–25
- Publication date
- 4 March 2026
- Language
- EN