The Art of Avoiding Serbia’s Defeat in the Case of Kosovo: The Promises and Limitations of International Law

Abstract The debate about Serbia’s defeat regarding Kosovo in 1999 is still ongoing. Questions such as whether the Kumanovo Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 formalized that defeat or not, what are the consequences of that defeat, and how it affected Kosovo’s final status, are part of everyday conversations in Serbia and beyond. These questions have a significant impact on contemporary Serbia and the understanding of its national interests. This paper focuses on how international law affected Serbia’s self-perception of its wartime defeat and presents two main arguments. First, it posits that the post-World War II state practice confirms that international law’s prohibition of the use of force has fundamentally changed the understanding of the concept of war defeat in international relations. Specifically, achieving victory through force no longer permits the annexation of defeated states’ territories. In this context, international law has significantly restricted policy options for victorious states and promised to the defeated ones: you will continue to exist with unchanged borders even after the military defeat. Second, the paper argues that the case study of Serbia demonstrates the limitations of international law’s influence on the concept of defeat. It shows that victorious states are finding avenues to circumvent international law’s restrictions and impose their will on militarily defeated states, undermining the principle of territorial integrity of defeated states.