Moral Luck, Blameworthiness and mens rea

Abstract Two assassins shoot at their respective targets—one hits, one misses. Two drivers text while driving—one hits a pedestrian, the other does not. Are the agents who cause harm more blameworthy than their counterparts? Philosophers often claim we must treat these cases symmetrically: outcome luck either matters in both cases or in neither. I challenge this assumption by defending an asymmetrical view. While outcome luck makes a difference in the drivers’ case, it cannot reduce the missing assassin’s blameworthiness. By texting while driving, both drivers incurred the moral risk of ending up more blameworthy if they harmed someone. The fortunate driver deserves less blame than her counterpart because she neither intended nor caused harm. This reasoning does not extend to the missing assassin, who is not lucky in the everyday sense; she missed contrary to her intention. I propose that luck’s mitigating influence is strongest in negligence cases but diminishes as the agent’s quality of will worsens, moving along the spectrum from negligence through recklessness to direct intent.