Aristotle on Conflicting Appearances

Abstract This article explains Aristotle’s view of conflicting appearances of the same objects in perception. Examining his responses to the Protagoreans who take all such appearances as true, the article argues that Aristotle treats this epistemological position as fundamentally metaphysical. He distinguishes two versions of Protagoreanism, each connected to a distinct metaphysical thesis: a realist thesis urging simultaneous ascription of contrary perception-independent qualities to objects, and an anti-realist thesis making perceptible qualities’ existence dependent on perception. Against both positions, Aristotle develops a restrictive realist response that preserves the perception-independent existence of qualities while denying that all appearing qualities actually belong to objects—thereby indicating the previously underappreciated scope of his realism. Rather than revising our conception of the world’s uniform structure, Aristotle suggests that we should treat conflicting appearances as perceptual deceptions arising from deviations in perceivers’ conditions such as illness, distance, or weakness.