Democratic Civilian Control in Limited-Access Orders: Rethinking Civil–Military Relations in Nigeria

This article examines civil–military relations in Nigeria through an integrated application of civil–military relations theory and the Limited-Access Order (LAO) framework. Despite the formal institutionalization of democratic control since 1999, military effectiveness and accountability remain constrained by neopatrimonial politics, elite bargaining, and weak oversight. Drawing on 23 elite interviews and document analysis, the study shows that constitutional mechanisms for civilian control are undermined by politicized appointments, institutional fragmentation, and regional disparities in governance. By synthesizing normative theories of civilian oversight with a political-economy perspective, the article explains how authority is produced and negotiated within hybrid political orders. It argues that reforming Nigeria’s civil–military relations requires addressing both institutional weaknesses and structural incentives sustaining elite cohesion, which undermine institutions under the LAO. The findings advance comparative debates on democratic consolidation and security governance in postcolonial and limited-access contexts.