Advantageous candidates and the selection process
Abstract
I study elections where some candidates have an advantage unrelated to their competence. Although this advantage is negligible in general elections, it is significant during candidate selection by parties. Further, the built-in advantages of some candidates may be a measure of the political system’s inefficiency. The selection of candidates by a party is a crucial institution for this inefficiency to exist. Theoretically, I show that the preciseness of the party’s estimation of candidates’ chances of winning a general election has a non-monotonic effect.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Political Dynamics in Latin America
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Rationality and Society
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 249–264
- Publication date
- 12 February 2026
- Language
- EN