Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Ideological Conflicts
Abstract
Besley and Ghatak (2001) discuss the optimal ownership structure of public goods in the presence of non-contractible decisions on the project design to demonstrate the robustness of their main result. They claim that when the owner dictates the design, allocating ownership of public goods to a key investor with a lower valuation of the goods may be optimal. This study extends their discussion by incorporating a contest framework to determine the design of public goods. We show that when the contest winner determines the project design, allocating ownership of public goods to a non-investor with a lower valuation of the goods can be optimal under intense conflict.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Economic Policies and Impacts
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Economic theories and models
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Public Finance Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 840-856
- Publication date
- 28 April 2026
- Language
- EN