Civilian control of political decision-making institutions and civil war

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Authors: Rizwan Asghar
Cited by: 0
References: 66

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Abstract

Previous research has emphasised the importance of institutions that allow representation of opposition groups’ interests in reducing the risk of civil war. However, the extant research has overlooked the function of top executive policymaking bodies that play a key role in formulating legislative agendas and are responsible for policy implementation. Considering the role of top policymaking bodies (cabinet and state councils), this article examines the effect of variation in civilian control of political decision-making institutions. I argue that weak civilian control of political decision-making increases the risk of civil conflict by reducing civilian input in policy formulation and enabling the translation of the military’s hawkish preferences into core policies. The results provide strong support for my hypothesis and are robust to alternative explanations. I complement these results with a case study of El Salvador (1975–1980), which corroborates the causal mechanisms highlighted in the theory.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Political Conflict and Governance Peacebuilding and International Security Politics and Society in Latin America

Publication details

Journal / source
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
Publication date
31 March 2026
Language
EN