Unpacking Corporate Slack: How Excess Resources Shape Earnings Management

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Authors: Yi-Ching Liaw, Quang‐Thai Truong, Robin Chen, Aldrich Alfatera Unpapar
Cited by: 0
References: 74

Abstract

This study investigates the dual role of organizational slack in shaping managerial behavior by examining its impact on earnings management. Using a large sample of 89,782 firm-year observations of US-listed firms from 1991 to 2022, we find that firms with greater slack are generally less likely to engage in earnings manipulation. We interpret these findings through the lens of the resource-based view (RBV), which provides a perspective on how slack, as a strategic resource, can influence managerial choices. Specifically, by alleviating short-term performance pressures, slack enables managers to prioritize long-term value creation over opportunistic reporting. Decomposing slack into its components reveals nuanced patterns: its effect on real earnings management is robust across firms, whereas its impact on discretionary accruals is significant primarily in firms with strong managerial incentives. Taken together, these findings enhance our understanding of how resource flexibility shapes firms’ financial reporting. Jel Classification: G32; G34; M41

Fields of Study & Subjects

Auditing Earnings Management Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management Accounting and Organizational Management

Publication details

Journal / source
BRQ Business Research Quarterly
Volume
29
Publication date
1 February 2026
Language
EN