How to Make AlphaGo's Children Explainable?

Under the rubric of understanding the problem of explainability of artificial intelligence (AI) in terms of abductive cognition, I propose to review the lessons from AlphaGo and her more powerful successors. As AI players in Baduk (Go, Weiqi ) have arrived at a superhuman level, there seems to be no hope for understanding the secret of their breathtakingly brilliant moves. Without making AI players explainable in some ways, both human and AI players would be less-than omniscient, if not ignorant, epistemic agents. Are we bound to have less explainable AI Baduk players as they make further progress? I shall show that the resolution of this apparent paradox depends on how we understand the crucial distinction between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). Some further philosophical issues arising from explainable AI will also be discussed in connection with this distinction.