Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

American Economic Review 2026

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Authors: Shani Cohen, Shengwu Li
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230309
Cited by: 2
References: 18

Abstract

We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information. (JEL C73, D44, D71, D81, D83, D91)

Fields of Study & Subjects

Game Theory and Applications Economic theories and models Auction Theory and Applications

Publication details

Journal / source
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Volume
116
Issue
3
Pages
934–976
Publication date
27 February 2026
Language
EN