Manipulation-Robust Prediction
Abstract
An increasing number of decisions are guided by machine learning algorithms. But when consequential decisions are encoded in algorithms, individuals may strategically alter their behavior to achieve desired outcomes. This paper develops an empirical approach that adjusts decision algorithms to anticipate manipulation. By explicitly modeling incentives to manipulate, our approach produces decision rules that are stable under manipulation, even when the rules are fully transparent. We stress-test this approach through a large field experiment in Kenya. When implemented, linear strategy-robust decision rules outperform standard linear models such as LASSO. (JEL C45, C93, D12, D91, G51, O12, O16)
Fields of Study & Subjects
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Auction Theory and Applications
Publication details
- Journal / source
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 3263–3293
- Publication date
- 28 August 2026
- Language
- EN