Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination
Abstract
A group of agents with ex-ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbours), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbours (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent’s ex-ante winning probability is monotone in degree. All equilibria that satisfy some robustness criteria lie between this adverse disclosure equilibrium and a less informative one that features no snitching and no discrimination.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Corruption and Economic Development
Law
Economics
and Judicial Systems
Legal and Constitutional Studies
Publication details
- Journal / source
- American Economic Journal Microeconomics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 192–227
- Publication date
- 27 April 2026
- Language
- EN