Cardinality and Utilitarianism through Social Interactions
Abstract
We provide axioms that relate the preferences of each group in a society to the preferences of the subgroups contained in them. These axioms yield cardinal utility indices for each individual and a representation of group preferences as the group-dependent weighted sum of the utility indices of the members of that group. We show that these weights are group independent whenever one additional axiom and a mild linear independence assumption are satisfied. (JEL D11, D71, D81, D83)
Fields of Study & Subjects
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Economic theories and models
Publication details
- Journal / source
- American Economic Journal Microeconomics
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 208–253
- Publication date
- 28 January 2026
- Language
- EN