Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability
Abstract
This paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to 2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on political circumstances: Only those in safe seats can change their political agenda toward policies that involve short-term costs for long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral incentives in shaping politicians' attitudes toward farsighted policymaking. (JEL D72, Q54, Q58)
Fields of Study & Subjects
Disaster Management and Resilience
Island Studies and Pacific Affairs
Climate Change
Adaptation
Migration
Publication details
- Journal / source
- American Economic Journal Economic Policy
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 135–162
- Publication date
- 30 July 2026
- Language
- EN