Cross-State Strategic Voting

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Authors: Gordon B. Dahl, Joseph Engelberg, Runjing Lu, William Mullins
Cited by: 0
References: 46

Abstract

We estimate that 3.1 percent of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zip codes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states that automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote. (JEL D63, D72, K16)

Fields of Study & Subjects

Electoral Systems and Political Participation Game Theory and Voting Systems Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting

Publication details

Journal / source
American Economic Journal Economic Policy
Volume
18
Issue
1
Pages
159–189
Publication date
29 January 2026
Language
EN