Ukraine and Russia as the “Other” in Lithuanian Foreign Policy discourse after 1991

Background State identity is a complex topic often analyzed through state roles. While some scholars equate roles with identity, others see roles as part of a broader identity framework. In Lithuanian foreign policy, the Russian Federation is widely considered the main "Other." This article aims to verify this assumption by studying official discourse and to analyze Ukraine's role as an "Other" in comparison to Russia, especially just after February 2022. Methods The study employs content and discourse analysis of public statements made by six Lithuanian presidents from 1994 to 2019, and additional statements from President Nausėda from December 2021 to April 2022. The analysis is conducted inductively, following Bentley B. Allan's approach to discourse analysis, which allows texts to reveal identities without predefined frameworks. Results The analysis identified 82 texts with 108 references to "Others." Russia was the most frequently mentioned "Other," appearing 51 times, predominantly as a negative entity. Ukraine was mentioned 16 times, primarily in a positive context. The frequency of references to Russia increased significantly after 2014, correlating with the situation in Ukraine. The study also found that Lithuania's roles as a promoter of democracy, mediator-advocate, and bridge-junction of civilizations significantly influenced its discourse on Ukraine and Russia. Conclusions Russia remains the most significant "Other" in Lithuanian foreign policy, shaping both state and national identity. Ukraine emerged as an important "Other" after 2014, reflecting Lithuania's roles in international relations. The ongoing war in Ukraine has further solidified Ukraine's position as a friendly "Other," influencing both foreign policy discourse and national identity in Lithuania. Further research is needed to explore the long-term impact of these dynamics.