Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia - contenuto non piu disponibile
Abstract
Does self-deception constitute a threat to the distinguishing kind of rationality human beings enjoy? I propose a compromise between the deflationary solutions to the alleged puzzles selfdeception has long been taken to give rise to and some virtues of the competing account -namely, the intentionalist view. In order to fulfil the task, I argue as to precisely what is left to blame in self-deception once we have made sense of why intentionalism fails to capture the nature of the phenomenon.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Neuroethics
Human Enhancement
Biomedical Innovations
Publication details
- Publisher
- Firenze University Press
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 147–179
- Publication date
- 8 July 2026
- Language
- EN