Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia - contenuto non piu disponibile
Abstract
Recent trends in empirical social psychology showed that situational factors affect human behaviour more than character traits do. Relying on these data, some philosophers (notably Gilbert Harman and John Doris) argued that moral philosophy should abandon the Aristotelian concept of character or ground virtue ethics on narrow socially sustained character traits. This paper argues that these criticisms are unsound because they misconstrue Aristotelian virtue ethics and the role of character traits in moral reasoning.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Ethics in Business and Education
Emotions and Moral Behavior
Publication details
- Publisher
- Firenze University Press
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 287–306
- Publication date
- 8 July 2026
- Language
- EN