Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia - contenuto non piu disponibile

In this paper I will present the formal aspects and developments of the Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) referred to its main theorems and problems. I will argue for the existence of two distinctive limits of the EGT: an intrinsic limit, represented by the impossibility of defining an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) into the multitude of the points of attraction; and an extrinsic limit, represented by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The methodological aim of my paper is developing a philosophical analysis of some important concept – as rationality, choice, preference, desire, will, need – which characterize the actual debate on morals. Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, evolutionary stable strategy, Replicator Dynamics, J. Maynard Smith, K. Binmore, B. Skyrms, justice, Prisoner’s Dilemma