Bureaucratic control after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo: the rise of judicial control in a post-Chevron deference world

This paper argues that the elimination of Chevron deference marks a significant institutional shift in bureaucratic control. With the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the judiciary now assumes an active role in legislative interpretation. The paper outlines four existing theories: self-control, congressional control, presidential control, and interest group control. These theories fail to fully capture the judiciary's enhanced role following the elimination of Chevron deference. It then introduces a new theory of bureaucratic control: Judicial Control Theory. Here, rather than being passive reviewers, judges now have the opportunity to assert primary control over the interpretation of vague and ambiguous legislation. This new institutional environment alters the incentives of other actors and does not represent a return to the pre-Chevron deference status quo. By identifying the judiciary as a strategic actor with the ability to steer legislative interpretation, this paper reframes how bureaucratic control operates under current institutional constraints.