Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator Is Also Well-informed
Abstract
abstract: When we use the shorthand ‘impartial spectator,’ we should not forget that the Smithian authoritative moral perspective is also well-informed. But is there anything more to say about the import and nature of this qualification? In this paper, I argue that the only way for Smith to explain how we can correct two kinds of problematic moral judgments is by invoking well-informedness, understood in a way that involves information about the psychology of moral judgment. I also argue that this interpretation reveals a crucial way in which The Theory of Moral Sentiments functions as a morally educational text.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Historical Economic and Legal Thought
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Journal of the history of philosophy
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 77–99
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026
- Language
- EN