Determination ( niścaya ) as the Cognitive Result ( pramāṇaphala ): Dignāga’s Ambiguity about Cognitive Result

This paper argues that Dignāga is ambiguous regarding whether conceptual determination ( niścaya ) constitutes the cognitive result ( pramāṇaphala ). First, I demonstrate that niścaya is conceptual in Dignāga’s context, evidenced by his refutations of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsaka. Second, I argue that his critique of Nyāya implicitly presupposes that determination functions as the result, a premise Jinendrabuddhi makes explicit. While Dignāga categorically identifies non-conceptual self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) as the result, I propose that his ambiguity arises because self-awareness’ status as a valid result depends on its accomplishment of determination. This accomplishment serves as the empirical ground for inward self-awareness to be conventionally viewed as outward cognition, thereby resolving the problem of different objects ( viṣayabheda ). Finally, I sketch a mechanism where self-awareness furnishes mental consciousness with the particular that determination conceptualizes, challenging strictly non-conceptualist portraits of Dignāga’s epistemology.