BAAR: A framework for blockchain-based anonymous and revocable user authentication scheme

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Authors: Muhammad Hammad Ahmed, Adnan Ahmad, Furkh Zeshan, Sheeraz Akram
Cited by: 1
References: 23

Abstract

Blockchain-based systems increasingly require authentication mechanisms that simultaneously preserve user privacy, support accountability, and enable efficient credential revocation. However, most existing anonymous authentication schemes rely on pairing-based cryptography which introduce high computational overhead and limit deploy ability on widely adopted blockchain platforms such as Ethereum. This paper presents BAAR, a Blockchain-based Anonymous and Revocable authentication framework designed entirely within the discrete logarithm setting over the secp256k1 elliptic curve. BAAR integrates Pedersen vector commitments, Schnorr-based zero-knowledge proofs, and a Merkle-tree-based dynamic accumulator to support anonymous and unlinkable authentication with selective attribute disclosure and public, auditable revocation. Authentication and proof verification are performed off-chain, while the blockchain maintains only a compact revocation state, significantly reducing on-chain computation and gas costs. A formal security analysis demonstrates unforgeability, unlinkability, attribute privacy, and revocation soundness under standard cryptographic assumptions in the random oracle model. A prototype implementation on Ethereum confirms that BAAR achieves low gas consumption, logarithmic-time revocation, and scalable performance with respect to both the number of users and attributes. These results indicate that BAAR provides a practical balance between strong privacy guarantees and deploy ability, making it suitable for real-world blockchain-based identity and access-control systems.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Cryptography and Data Security Blockchain Technology Applications and Security Advanced Authentication Protocols Security

Publication details

Journal / source
PLoS ONE
Publisher
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Volume
21
Issue
3
Pages
e0343696–e0343696
Publication date
31 March 2026
Language
EN