Kant on the Difference between Right and Ethics: Are We Capable of Acting (Solely) from Duty?

In the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant distinguishes between two types of moral legislation; he calls one juridical and the other ethical legislation. Due to this distinction, the late writing is divided into right and ethics. In this paper, I argue that one of the criteria by which the Metaphysics of Morals primarily distinguishes these two legislations, and hence right and ethics, is questionable. The respective criterion concerns the moral incentive; according to the late writing, ethical legislation demands one to act from respect for the law, whereas juridical legislation instead allows one to act by virtue of any empirical incentive. While some commentators consider Kant’s conception of juridical legislation to be in contradiction with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason , I argue that it is his conception of ethical legislation that is problematic: it is this type of legislation that contradicts the Groundwork and the second Critique.