Kant and Environmental Ethics, Starting from the Doctrine of Virtue

The purpose of this paper is to show the extent to which Kant provides theoretical elements that can contribute to the environmental ethics debate. Although Kant is almost entirely absent from the early tradition of environmental ethics, and although he does not include nature among the objects with moral standing, the notion of “indirect duty regarding nature” proposed in the Metaphysics of Morals (specifically in the Doctrine of Virtue ) provides sufficient grounds to justify an extension of moral duties to include the non-human natural world. This notion concerns the cultivation of dispositions and feelings towards animals and non-sentient beings that contribute to the promotion of human morality, thereby suggesting an environmental approach—based on both virtues and the moral law—that justifies a non-instrumental consideration of nature without contradicting the anthropocentric foundations of Kantian ethics. The outline of a Kantian environmental position thus offers the opportunity to shed light on some implications and problematic issues in Kant’s theory of value.