“Das Gefühl ist factisch das erste ursprüngliche”: Remarks on the Role of Feeling in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo

This paper examines the role of feeling in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (1796/1799), highlighting its significance in response to Kant’s accusation of mere logicism and, as a result, of solipsism against Fichte’s philosophical system. The analysis contends that Kant’s objections misinterpret Fichte’s position, rooted in a doctrine of feelings, which is pivotal for understanding the relationship between the mind and the world. By demonstrating how feeling provides the anchoring of our representations in reality and the key to the relation between ideal and empirical realms, the paper argues that Fichte’s framework offers a solution to a crucial aspect of pure apperception left unresolved by Kant. That is what Fichteachieves through the concepts of a “system of sensibility” and “feeling of self”. Moreover, Fichte’s theory of feelings, in its connection with the other fundamental concept of “strive”, is aimed to provide the objective validity of the ideas of God, right, and morality.