General and Detailed Knowledge in Bahshamite Epistemology The Case of Ethical Values

This article delves into a rather unexplored concept in Bahshamite epistemology: the two modes of knowledge. According to this notion, something can be known either generally ( ʿalā ṭarīq / sabīl al-jumla, mujmalan ) or in detail ( ʿalā ṭarīq / sabīl al-tafṣīl, mufaṣṣalan ). These two modes of knowing appear in various contexts within Bahshamite sources. The present paper elaborates on these two ways of knowing, enumerating their respective attributes and examining their place in the ‘given’ pieces of knowledge ( ḍarūrī ). It also aims to reconstruct the debate with the objective of gaining a deeper understanding of the kinds of objects to which they refer. In the second part, a case study is presented on how ʿAbd al-Jabbār employs this concept to defend ethical values against attacks that accuse them of being subjective. He maintains that ethical values count as general knowledge ( mujmal ) as opposed to detailed knowledge ( mufaṣṣal ). As general knowledge, it pertains to a distinct noetic kind ( jins ) that is distinguished from subjective beliefs. It is presumed that the dualistic way of knowing sheds new light not only on Bahshamite epistemology but also on the subtleties of their ethical discourse.