EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION STRATEGIES FROM A COMPETITIVE PERSPECTIVE

Against the backdrop of multi-level governance, intergovernmental cooperation on environmental regulation among local governments often involves complex interactions between strategic adjustments and institutional incentives.From the perspective of competitive evolutionary games, this study constructs a multi-dimensional dynamic model that incorporates institutional incentives, capacity heterogeneity, and feedback from benefit structures.It identifies and analyzes three evolutionary modes "race to the bottom", "race to the top", and "differentiated competition" and conducts numerical simulations across four key dimensions: institutional incentives, initial conditions, benefit structures, and cost configurations.The results reveal that local governments' environmental regulatory behaviors exhibit significant path dependence and a "trust window" effect.Institutional incentives, by reshaping marginal returns, enhance the strategic appeal of cooperative regulation and serve as a key driver of a stable equilibrium.The sustainability of cooperation is largely determined by benefit distribution, while cost structures-especially their elasticity-directly influence strategic preferences.This study contributes to understanding multi-tiered environmental governance and provides theoretical support and policy implications for strengthening incentives, enhancing cooperation stability, and refining differentiated regulatory frameworks.