Nothingness is said in many ways: Leibniz’s concepts of nothingness

Abstract: This paper aims to survey and discuss Leibniz’s definitions and uses of nothingness (nihil, le rien, le néant), especially in his middle writings. There are arguably three senses of nothingness in Leibniz’s essays from the late 1670s to the mid-1680s: (i) the concept that does not contain any other concept, (ii) the complete notion which contains the negation of every perfection, (iii) names without associated concepts. Leibniz also often speaks of nothingness as a kind of (iv) general inexistence. I will argue that both concepts (i) and (ii) are consistent and that (ii) is a negative counterpart to God’s complete notion. I, then, present some arguments in favor of the view that (ii) does exist in God’s understanding, yet cannot be instantiated, which entails that there are two non-coextensive senses of possibility, i.e., consistency and instantiability: There would be a complete notion which is not the complete notion of a (possible) individual substance.