Nudge and Moral Behavior: A Study on the Behavioral Effects of Credit Scores in the Social Credit System

This study employs a 2 (Behavior Type: Compliance vs. Virtue) × 4 (Policy Instrument: Control vs. Monetary vs. Social Credit vs. Mixed) between-subjects factorial survey experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of the Social Credit System (SCS) in China. While traditional economic theory suggests that stronger incentives lead to better compliance, behavioral public administration theories (e.g., Motivation Crowding Theory) argue that external incentives might undermine intrinsic motivation, particularly for prosocial behaviors. This study specifically examines whether "Social Credit Scores"—as a cumulative, reputational, and gamified policy tool—function differently from traditional monetary incentives. We hypothesize that while mixed incentives (Money + Credit) maximize compliance for mandatory obligations (e.g., regulating bike parking), pure reputational incentives (Social Credit Points) are more effective for voluntary virtue-based behaviors (e.g., volunteering), whereas monetary incentives may induce a "crowding-out effect" in the latter context.