Abstract
In 2004, Ned Hall argued that there are two concepts of causation: dependence and production. Since then, various authors have argued for some version or other of conceptual pluralism (see Cartwright 2007, Hitchcock 2003, Psillos 2008, 2010, Lombrozo 2010, Weingartner 2016 though see Phuong and Danks 2021 for an alternative view). Let us begin by distinguishing causal conceptual pluralism from causal metaphysical pluralism (for discussion see Froeyman and de Vreese 2008). Conceptual pluralism is a claim about our concept(s) of causation. It is, roughly, the claim that we have multiple such concepts (two or more). Conceptual monism is the claim that we have just one such concept. Metaphysical pluralism is the view that there is more than one relation in the world that is causation. Metaphysical monism is the view that there is just one causal relation in the world. One way to think about metaphysical pluralism is as the view that causation is multiply realized; another is that it is the view that causation is a type-level phenomenon that has a number of different sub-types that fall under it. In both cases, there must be something in common between all the different types of ways of realizing causation, since otherwise we surely ought to eliminate talk of causation altogether and replace it with talk of each of these distinct, unrelated, relations. In this study, we focus on conceptual pluralism/monism, though we will ultimately also be interested in the implications for theorizing about metaphysical pluralism/monism, from findings about conceptual monism/pluralism. That is because, as Phuong and Danks (2021) point out, several arguments for metaphysical pluralism trade on the claim that conceptual pluralism is true. To see this, let’s further distinguish between psychological conceptual monism/pluralism and revisionary conceptual monism/pluralism. Psychological conceptual monism/pluralism are each views about the concept(s) people in fact employ. So, the psychological pluralist says that people in fact employ two or more causal concepts, while the psychological monist says that they in fact employ one. Revisionary conceptual monism/pluralism are views about what sorts of concepts we ought to employ, leaving open whether or not we do in fact employ them. For instance, the revisionary pluralist says that we ought to employ two (or more) concepts of causation. It is easy to see how one might be led to revisionary pluralism from metaphysical pluralism. Clearly, if there are multiple kinds of causation, then it is desirable to have concepts that pick each of those out. (Indeed, on one reading of Hall 2004, he argues for metaphysical causal pluralism and only indirectly for conceptual pluralism). In this study we shall be interested in psychological conceptual monism/pluralism. We are interested, then, in which concepts of causation people in fact employ. In turn, we shall ultimately be interested in what, if anything, we should infer as regards metaphysical causal monism/pluralism, on the basis of the nature of people’s causal concepts (for discussion see also Bernstein 2018).