Beyond the 99%: How Problem Awareness and Computational Support Overcome Reputation Inflation

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Authors: Jianlin Zhao
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Abstract

The fundamental challenge of anonymous e-commerce is resolving information asymmetry: buyers cannot inspect goods beforehand (Milan et al., 2015), and sellers—often engaging in non-relational, one-off interactions—have limited incentives to be transparent about quality (Akerlof, 1970). While reputation systems were designed to bridge this trust gap (Resnick et al., 2000; Dellarocas, 2003), they are increasingly suffering from “reputation inflation” (Bolton et al., 2013; Nosko & Tadelis, 2015; Tadelis, 2016; Filippas et al., 2018), rendering public scores misleading. While reputation inflation has long been a documented issue in e-commerce, the recent implementation of automated positive feedback exacerbates this pre-existing flaw (eBay, 2025). This policy pushes an already distorted metric to the breaking point, ensuring that a '99% positive' score obscures true performance rather than signaling quality. Since we cannot rely on sellers to be honest (because of moral hazard) or the platform to correct the metric (because of conflicting incentives), the solution must empower the buyer directly. This project proposes an algorithm-guided intervention that uses existing public data to ‘de-anchor’ buyers from these inflated scores. By revealing the Adjusted Rating Scores (ARS) hidden beneath the platform's flawed metrics, we aim to restore the buyer’s ability to distinguish between high-performing sellers and those merely hiding behind automation. The potential contribution in the short run would be on the buyer side, primarily acting as a correction in risk perception. By de-anchoring expectations from pooled signals, the tool prevents buyers from unwittingly selecting low-quality sellers disguised by automation. This ensures buyers minimize the “gap” between expected and realized quality. This leads to allocative efficiency, where capital flows to genuine high-performers, and significantly reduces the transaction costs associated with disputes and returns. In the long term, the implications extend to the market level, where the intervention restores systemic discipline. By preventing automation from disguising low-quality sellers, the tool directly improves signal precision. Once the ARS devalues the artificial 100% score, sellers can no longer rely on hollow metrics to maintain their status. Instead, they are forced to abandon these tricks and compete on intrinsic quality to survive.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Auction Theory and Applications Digital Platforms and Economics Spam and Phishing Detection

Publication details

Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint