Political Attitudes and Identity in Thailand Survey

Political Attitudes and Identity in Thailand Survey Allen Hicken, Eddy Malesky, Joel Selway PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN Project 1. Strong Leaders and Democracy Political Scientists have long studied citizens’ support for democracy. In public opinion surveys, this has taken many forms, from asking for general support of the general concept of democracy to specific support for democracy within the respondent’s country. One variety of questions explores tradeoffs between democracy and other desirable social, political, and economic outcomes. Relatedly, political scientists have frequently asked a question on the tradeoff between democracy and a strong leader. But what type of leader respondents might have in mind could vary significantly and is context dependent. Specifically, it might vary by which political party a respondent supports, which part of the government respondents link leadership strength to, or their general orientations towards authority. While statistical models assume such variation is randomly distributed, we are interested in whether such variation leads to systematically different responses on the tradeoff between democracy and having a strong leader. We develop the following general hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. Citizens will be more (less) willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader if the strong leader in question is from the political side they support (the political opposition). Hypothesis 2. Citizens will be more (less) willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader if the strong leader in question is from an institution related (unrelated) to electoral politics, e.g. members of parliament, prime ministers, presidents, etc. (military leaders, traditional leaders, etc.) Hypothesis 3. Citizens will be more willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader if the strong leader is from the past (e.g. a historic figure, a figure no longer participating in politics, a deceased figure). Hypothesis 4. Citizens will be less willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader if the strong leader is unfamiliar to them. We test these hypotheses in the context of Thailand, a country which has oscillated between democracy and authoritarianism for decades. Strong leadership is a frequently-cited justification for support for various political leaders, including non-democratic ones. The non-democratic leaders come from two institutions: the military and the monarchy. As per the constitution, the monarchy is above politics. However, many Thais see the institution as political—either as the symbolic basis of state legitimacy or as an institution that sometimes is involved in politics (which involvement they may support to varying degrees). For the most part, these two institutions have been associated with the conservative political side in Thai politics, i.e. conservative elected politicians aligned with “the military-monarchy establishment”. On the other political side, we have elected politicians aligned with what is commonly referred to as the “pro-democracy” side (though this label is subjective and anti-establishment might be the more neutral [and accurate] term). Since the early 2000s, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra has been the symbolic leader of the pro-democracy side. His party repeatedly won elections from 2001 to 2019. He was ousted in a coup in 2006, and every prime minister from his party since has been removed from office either by a coup or by the conservative “independent” judiciary. No civilian leader has been viewed as the prime representative of the conservative side. Voters in Thailand tend to support one side or the other, but the institution of the monarchy complicates this. Significant members of the pro-democracy side have deep respect for the monarchy. Voters from both political sides have expressed less affect toward the current king. We thus develop the following hypotheses specific to Thailand: Hypothesis 5. Citizens who support pro-democracy parties will be most willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader when the strong leader in question is Thaksin Shinawatra. Hypothesis 7. Citizens who support pro-democracy parties will be unmoved in their tradeoff between democracy and a strong leader when the strong leader in question is the late king, Bhumibol. Hypothesis 8. Citizens who support pro-democracy parties will be less willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader when the strong leader in question is the current king, Vajiralongkorn. Hypothesis 9. Citizens who support pro-democracy parties will be least willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader when the strong leader in question is Prayut Chan-o-cha. Hypothesis 10. Citizens who support the military-monarchy establishment will be least willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader when the strong leader in question is Thaksin Shinawatra. Hypothesis 11. Citizens who support the military-monarchy establishment will be unmoved in their tradeoff between democracy and a strong leader when the strong leader in question is the current king, Vajiralongkorn. Hypothesis 12. Citizens who support the military-monarchy establishment will be more willing to tradeoff democracy for a strong leader when the strong leader in question is Prayut Chan-o-cha. Hypothesis 13. Citizens who support the military-monarchy establishment will be most willing to tradeoff between democracy and a strong leader when the strong leader in question is the late king, Bhumibol. We test the general and Thailand-specific hypotheses with a survey experiment. We randomize respondents into one of four treatment groups each of which primes respondents to think about a particular individual: Thaksin Shinawatra, Prayuth Chan-o-cha, King Vajiralongkorn, and King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The prime consists of showing respondents a picture of the individual, then asking them which institution the individual is associated with and what achievement they are renown for. With the individual primed in their mind, we then ask them the strong leader – democracy tradeoff question. A few other alternative democracy questions follow the strong leader question. We generally think these will track the strong leader question, especially the question on general support of democracy. However, other tradeoff questions might be unrelated to the leader in question, or directly affected by the leader (e.g. Thaksin’s general reputation for acumen in economic growth, the late King Bhumibol’s philosophy of economic sufficiency). Various additional variables from the survey will also be used as control variables (e.g. regional fixed effects) or as heterogeneous treatment effects (e.g. do the results differ systematically by gender?). These variables include basic demographics, partisanship, and other political behavior / political attitudes. Additionally, we ask questions about the meaning of democracy. We will explore whether an individual’s understanding of what democracy is affects the outcomes. The main dependent variable is the democracy-strong leader tradeoff question. The exact wording is: On some occasions, democracy doesn't work. When that happens, there are people that say we need a strong leader who doesn't have to be elected through voting. Others say that even if things don't function, democracy is always the best. What do you think? บางครั้ง ระบอบประชาธิปไตยก็ไม่เป็นไปตามที่คาดหวัง เมื่อเป็นเช่นนี้แล้ว ก็มักจะมีคนบอกว่าเราต้องการผู้นำที่เข้มแข็งที่ไม่จำเป็นต้องถูกคัดเลือกมาด้วยการเลือกตั้ง แต่บางคนก็กล่าวเช่นกันว่า แม้ในยามที่สิ่งต่าง ๆ จะไม่เป็นไปตามที่คาดหวัง ประชาธิปไตยก็ยังคงเป็นระบบดีที่สุดอยู่เสมอ คุณมีความคิดเห็นอย่างไรกับข้อความดังกล่าว Strong leader is best (1) ผู้นำที่เข้มแข็งดีที่สุด (1) Democracy is best (2) ประชาธิปไตยดีที่สุด (2) Thus, the dependent variable is dichotomous. As such, we will use appropriate regression models for dichotomous dependent variables, e.g. logit or probit regressions. Let: StrongLeader, {0,1} LeaderPrime, be the main regressor Xi be a vector of control variables  the coefficient on LeaderPrime  the coefficient vector on the controls Ι{LeaderPrimei = k}, k {0,1,2,3,4} We thus will estimate: 〖StrongLeader〗_i= α +∑_(k=1)^4▒〖_k 〖I{LeaderPrime〗_i=k}+  X_i^T + ε_i 〗 Following are a couple of mock graphs that correspond to our general hypotheses: Project 2. Voter Favorability of Political Candidates What characteristics do Thai voters look for in candidates for political office? We first conducted a survey experiment on this question all the way back in 2011. Since that time, the political landscape has changed in dramatic ways, including a second coup, the passing of King Bhumibol and the coronation of his son Vajiralongkorn, the decline of the Democrat Party (the main party of the conservative side), the rise of parties explicitly linked to the military, and a longer tenure of junta rule. The mass protests that occurred in that period have also changed, with different support bases and issue foci. A new pro-democracy movement popular amongst young generations across all regions have staged protests with more radical demands on the institutions of the military and monarchy. This movement is aligned with a new progressive party, the People’s Party (formerly Move Forward), who were the most successful party in the 2023 elections and made inroads in both conservative and Thaksin-aligned parties. In 2023, we conducted a survey in which we presented respondents with two hypothetical candidates and varied descriptions of their demographics, speeches, personal history, and policies. Specifically, we varied the gender, party, region, work background, health policy, support for the monarchy, involvement in protests, and whether they were offering to votebuy. All the dimensions had 2+ options and were randomly chosen. Each respondent evaluated two pairs of candidates. Following the presentation of the candidates, we asked them questions about their favorability of each candidate. We hypothe