Kant Hardened Villain - Adult Version

Kant claims that even a hardened villain (someone of bad moral character) could do a morally good action because it is the right thing to do (from and for the sake of duty). We aim to see if people agree with this thought. Does the bad character of the actor "taint" the moral goodness of a morally good action? Or is there an incandescent core proper to morally good action (perhaps requiring that the agent be intrinsically motivated to do that action) that remains untouched by an agent's sordid past? In previous research we found that despite being told a person had bad moral character, information that the target did one good action (helped a lost child) dramatically boosted moral ratings of that person. This was true even when no motivation for the target's action was specified, suggesting people extend the moral benefit of the doubt (assume the target is intrinsically motivated) even to persons stipulated to have bad character. This study pushes against these results in two directed ways to examine further the robustness of these findings. First, the description of the good action involves helping an adult (by giving them money) rather than a child. We want to see if a less sympathetic beneficiary changes the impact the good action has on moral evaluation. Second, we add a series of questions about a real morally bad person from the participants' lives. Our hypothesis is that character judgments carry much more weight when we have reached them on the basis of accumulated experience, rather than simply asserted to be the case. Central Research Questions: 1a. Does the bad moral character of the agent impugn the moral goodness of their morally good actions? 1b. Is the specification of (intrinsic, morally good) motive more necessary for a target with bad moral character to get full moral credit, whereas a target of average character is given the benefit of the doubt? 1c. Does the doing of one morally good action prompt a revision to the rating of the person, perhaps by reminding participants of the true (i.e., morally good) self? 2. How do the effect sizes (for Motive, Character, and perhaps Motive x Character) compare from first version (child beneficiary with stipulated personal cost to target) to second version (adult beneficiary and less costly good action)? 3. How do the ratings of this imagined target compare to a real bad person (first moral evaluation, ratings of action with no motivation specified, second rating of real individual with good action and motive stipulated) from their lives?