Rebel Governance and International Legitimacy: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Delegation and Co-Governance in Rebel Service Provision

This study investigates how different rebel social service provision arrangements shape rebel groups’ perceived legitimacy among democratic publics. Existing research shows that rebels can gain legitimacy by providing inclusive social services to civilians, but prior experimental work typically presents rebels as sole providers, even though in practice they rarely monopolize service delivery. Instead, rebels often delegate services to international NGOs or co-govern alongside states or rival groups. We argue that these alternative arrangements (delegation and co-governance) alter how external audiences evaluate rebel legitimacy and the support they express for rebels, because they condition perceptions of rebels’ state-like capacity, benevolence, norm compliance, and ability to disrupt the stereotype of rebels as purely violent actors. To test these claims, we will field a preregistered survey experiment in which respondents are randomly assigned to scenarios describing the Oromo Liberation Front’s governance of education and healthcare in Ethiopia under different arrangements: direct provision, full delegation to an international NGO, partial delegation to an international NGO, or co-provision with either the state or a rival rebel group. We will measure attitudes toward the OLF, support for its goals, willingness to assist it, and perceptions of its governing qualities. By experimentally identifying how governance arrangements shape international legitimacy, the study advances theoretical and empirical understandings of rebel governance beyond the conventional focus on whether rebels govern at all.