Peters’s Critique of Freud: Rationality as the Foundation of Moral Motive

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Authors: Sang-Ik Hyun
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Abstract

This paper provides a critical examination of Peters’s interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis. While Peters credits Freud with expanding the scope of psychological inquiry by empirically validating the influence of the unconscious, he simultaneously levels a rigorous critique against Freud’s attempt to systematize his clinical insights within a framework of mechanistic reductionism. Central to this critique is Peters’s conviction that human action is categorically distinct from physical motion governed by causality. He contends that human action is not something merely caused by antecedent forces but is guided by purposive reasons based on public rules. By identifying rationality as the constitutive element of the concept of motive, Peters presents an alternative model, that is the rule-following purposive model of behaviour. While his theory invites significant theoretical challenges, it also offers a philosophical foundation for reconceptualizing motive as a fundamentally public and normative concept, thereby providing the ground for the possibility and necessity of the education of moral motives.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Psychoanalysis and Social Critique Education Philosophy and Society

Publication details

Journal / source
The Korean Society for the Study of Moral Education
Volume
38
Issue
1
Pages
57–81
Publication date
31 March 2026
Language
EN