Optimal Cyber-Attack Evaluation for Cross-Domain Cascading Failures Considering Spatiotemporal Synergy of Multiple Attack-Event-Chains

According to the dynamic interaction process between cyber flow and power flow in grid cyber-physical systems (GCPS), attackers could gradually trigger large-scale power failures through cooperative cyber-attacks, subsequently forming cross-domain cascading failures (CDCF) that cross cyber-domain and power-domain and endanger the stable running of GCPS. To reveal the evolutionary mechanism of CDCF, an optimal attack scheme evaluation method is proposed, considering the spatiotemporal synergy of multiple attack-event-chains. First, in accordance with the spatiotemporal synergy of multiple attack-event-chains, the CDCF evolutionary mechanism is analyzed from the attackers' perspective, and a CDCF mathematical model is established. Furthermore, an attack graph model of CDCF evolution and its hazard calculation method are proposed. Then, the attackers' decision-making process for the optimal attack scheme of CDCF is deduced based on the attack graph model. Finally, both the evaluation and implementation processes of the optimal attack scheme are simulated in the GCPS experimental system based on IEEE-39 bus systems.