Legal Statuses of the Central Bank of Russia: Regulatory Challenges

The article, based on analysis of legal scholarship and the general and special legislation of the Russian Federation, examines various elements of the legal status of the Bank of Russia. Characterized by both public and private features, the legal status of the lender of last resort exhibits notable specificities from the perspectives of constitutional, administrative, financial and civil law. Independence, above all from the executive branch, the development of key feedback mechanisms for managerial influence, and sufficiency of internal resources have enabled the emergence of the institution of mega-regulation on the basis of the Bank of Russia. The author notes that since 2013 the objectives of the issuing bank have been expanded to include the development and stability of the financial market, and that regulatory and supervisory powers in this area were assigned to the Committee for Financial Supervision created within the structure of the «bank of banks». Today, the coexistence of seemingly contradictory restrictive administrative powers and the goals of strategic financial-sector development requires consolidation of public and state interests and measures to mitigate the risk of excessive, uniform burdens on infrastructure. The article concludes that the central bank of the first tier functions not only as an instrument of the state’s monetary policy but also as a constitutional organ for governing a multi-level banking system. As a mega-regulator active in financial markets it seeks to combine supervisory and regulatory principles, and as a legal entity of a special legal nature it may employ economic or direct means of influence, blending elements of administration with aspects of its private-law status. The normative regulation of the national bank’s activity is marked by a wide range of general and special legislative acts, while the Bank’s own regulatory instruments warrant particular attention. According to the author, fulfillment of the legislator’s mandates for the «bank of banks» and the improvement of financial-market rulemaking are most effective when informed by foreign experience and enforcement practice