An Mu and the Korean National Army in Korea’s Independence War : A Historical Study of Organizational Formation, Battlefield Participation, and Ideological Transformation

This study reconstructs An Mu's(安武) wartime participation and organizational role in Korea's independence war. While previous scholarship focused primarily on whether An participated in the Battles of Bongodong and Cheongsanri, this research restores An Mu’s historical standing in a multifaceted way by comprehensively examining the formation and deployment of the Korean National Army, its combined military operations, and the organizational reconfiguration after the Free City Incident. First, through cross-examination of historical sources, the study clarifies An's entry into the Korean National Association (mid-October to early November 1919) and his appointment as Security Chief (January 1920). He was promoted to adjutant in the Three-Unit Alliance (May 1920) and finally appointed commander (August 1920), establishing command authority over the National Army. Second, at the battle of Bongodong, An served as adjutant while the Association contributed approximately 200 troops. In the Cheongsanri campaign, the National Army fulfilled core functions of mobilization, logistics, and reconnaissance, achieving notable success in the independent ‘Yuryeong battle’. Third, the northward movement following Cheongsanri campaign is interpreted as a strategic redeployment aligned with the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea’s plan for military unification and coordination with Soviet Russia. An participated in this grand coalition as the Second Brigade Commander of the Great Korean Independence Corps. Fourth, following the Free City Incident, An led the establishment of the Koryŏ Communist Party Central Assembly, transforming the Association's structure into a communist party system. His embrace of communism was not an ideological conversion but a strategic choice aimed at rebuilding a collapsed independence movement organization. While his experience in the Free City may have carried some ideological influence, this does not constitute sufficient counter-evidence to overturn that conclusion. Based on this analysis, An emerges not merely as a battlefield commander but as a strategic organizer who performed substantive roles in alliance-building and functional coordination among independence forces. His activities provide critical insights into the organizational restructuring and ideological differentiation of the North Gando independence movement in the 1920s.