CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS WITH DEFERRED EFFECT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES AGAINST THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Normatively, the Constitutional Court Law and the Law on the Establishment of Legislation only recognize non-self-executing decisions, as they require further action by the legislature or the President. However, in practice, the Constitutional Court frequently issues self-executing decisions, including those that reinterpret or redefine legal provisions. This raises constitutional challenges, particularly due to the lack of a clear legal basis and the potential conflict with the Court’s original philosophical and historical role as a judicial body. This study aims to examine: (1) the rationale behind the Court’s issuance of non-self-executing decisions; (2) the legal certainty regarding their implementation; and (3) the future framework for managing such decisions. Findings indicate that non-self-executing decisions are issued when norms fall under the domain of open legal policy, thereby deferring action to the legislature or the President. Legal certainty can be strengthened by introducing delayed enforceability and time limits for follow-up action. The study recommends revising relevant laws to provide a legal foundation for decisions involving new norms, conditional constitutionality, and deferred implementation while maintaining the principle that such decisions require legislative or executive follow-up within a specified timeframe.