Epistemology of Buddhist Perception: Some Problems

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Authors: Raghunath Ghosh
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Abstract

The paper deals with the problem whether the property of being uncontradicted (avisaṃvādakatva) is inconsistent to the phenomenon of momentariness admitted by the Buddhists. One may raise a question that an uncontradicted experience cannot be known within a moment (kṣaṇa). Hence to admit cognition as uncontradicted is to accept its non-momentary character. Though a different object is apprehended altogether yet we have a strong and definite cognition (adhyavasāya) in the form – ‘the object which is perceived is apprehended’ (dṛṣṭam eva prāptam). It is the case of the attainment of what has been perceived (pratītaprāpaṇa). To the Buddhists a wise man comes to know of an object by means of clearer perception (paṭutarapratyakṣa). As soon as it is attained, he comes to know of its causal efficacy at the same moment. Had there been no cognition of knowledge and its causal efficacy simultaneously, there would have been no reliability on cognition. Dharmottara has justified the first and second order causal efficacy with the following example. One can know of the existence of a jar and its utility or causal efficacy being pointed out by other at the first level which is called upadarśita or saṃvādaka. Afterwards, the same person can go and directly know the jar which is called second order causal efficacy. Hence there is no inconsistency in their thought

Fields of Study & Subjects

Indian and Buddhist Studies Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Study and Philosophy of Religion

Publication details

Journal / source
Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB)
Volume
39
Pages
1–13
Publication date
15 March 2026
Language
EN