Rethinking Legal Legitimacy

The relationship between law and morality has long been a central concern in legal philosophy, particularly in discussions of the legitimacy of legal systems. This question becomes increasingly pressing in pluralistic societies where diverse moral, cultural, and ethical perspectives coexist. This article critically examines classical legal positivism through the theories of Hans Kelsen and John Austin, both of whom advocate a strict separation between law and morality. While this approach offers legal certainty and analytical precision, this article argues that an exclusive reliance on formal validity risks distancing law from the moral expectations of the society it seeks to regulate. Legal norms that are formally valid yet morally disconnected may erode public trust, reduce compliance, and undermine social cohesion. In pluralistic contexts, law cannot operate effectively as a purely formal system detached from shared ethical concerns. This article, therefore, contends that legal legitimacy depends on a measured integration of moral reasoning, one that acknowledges moral diversity without subordinating law to any particular moral or religious doctrine. Accordingly, legal legitimacy should be understood not merely in a procedural or formal terms, but as a normative condition grounded in justice, human dignity, and moral accountability within a pluralistic legal order.Keywords: Law, Morality, Legal positivism, Pluralistic society, Legal legitimacy.