NPM ARCHITECTURE AS AN ATTACK SURFACE

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Authors: О. А. Сапальський, Oleksandr Zakovorotnyi, Валентин Иванович Носков
Cited by: 0
References: 2

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Abstract

Topicality. The npm ecosystem is a critical infrastructure layer of modern JavaScript/TypeScript development, and its security risks scale rapidly through automated dependency resolution, transitive dependencies, and installation-time script execution. As a result, supply-chain incidents in npm can affect a large number of downstream projects and CI/CD pipelines. The subject of study is the npm ecosystem as an attack surface, with a focus on architecture-dependent threat mechanisms related to package publication, package identity and resolution, publisher trust, installation-time execution, and dependency reproducibility and provenance. The purpose of the article is to provide an architecture-based analytical review of npm-specific supply-chain threats, to systematize them into a practical taxonomy, and to formulate a layered mitigation approach for engineering teams. Results obtained. The article explains the security-relevant properties of npm architecture (registry, CLI, publication, dependency resolution, and installation workflow), proposes an architecture-centered taxonomy of recurring threat mechanisms, analyzes representative incidents as empirical illustrations of these mechanisms, and summarizes protective measures as a layered control model covering dependency intake, deterministic builds, automated monitoring, CI/CD policy enforcement, and publisher hardening. Conclusion. Effective risk reduction in npm requires not a single tool, but coordinated technical and organizational controls across the dependency lifecycle; in particular, reproducible installation practices, selective control of lifecycle script execution, continuous dependency monitoring, and stronger publisher authentication and provenance mechanisms improve resilience and auditability without blocking delivery.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Information and Cyber Security Web Application Security Vulnerabilities Security and Verification in Computing

Publication details

Journal / source
Terra security
Volume
2
Issue
1
Pages
44–51
Publication date
27 March 2026
Language
EN