Artificial Other in the Architectonics of the Act

The architectonic of the act in Bakhtin’s early texts is founded on the coordinates “I‑for‑my­self”, “the other‑for‑me”, and “I‑for‑the‑other”. In his later works, where he develops the concept of dialogue, Bakhtin emphasizes that the Other must also be “I‑for‑myself” in order to be a full-fledged Other. But in his early philosophical texts Bakhtin treats the Other as an “object”, endowing this term with a broad semantic scope. This article is devoted to the study of the question of whether someone or something other than a person can be the Other in the architectonics of the act. Artificial intelligence systems capable of in­teracting with a person in natural language – without pre-programmed scripts (e.g. chatbots based on large language models, “smart” speakers, and voice assistants) – are considered contenders for the status of the Other, or rather, the artificial Other. I-for-myself retains its position in the architectonics of the act regardless of the qualities of the Other: it is always a person who is responsible and acting, not given but assigned. It is impossible to build mu­tual or equal relations with an artificial Other, but for a moral act of I-for-myself this is not required. The artificial Other-for-me cannot replace a person for a number of reasons (lack of corporeality, consciousness), but it can perform a function similar to that performed by the Other-person in the architectonics of the act: to resist the Self under the condition of value inequality with the latter. The relation “I‑for‑an‑artificial‑Other” can be visualized using the metaphors of an “as‑if transparent screen” and a special mirror – one designed to reflect the most intimate aspects of the I‑for‑myself. The inclusion of an artificial Other in the architectonics of the act expands the space of responsibility of the Self as the only possible author.