Kant on Lying. Historical and Philosophical Analysis

The inadmissibility of lying is widely recognized as one of the key features of Kant’s moral philosophy and arguably its most controversial characteristic. Kant is commonly positioned as a rigorist who does not allow lying under any circumstances, insisting on this prohibition as an unconditional ethical requirement. In support of this position, Kant’s own arguments from the article “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy” are usually cited. Equally widespread, however, is the reproach that Kant is inconsistent, since certain formulations of the categorical imperative seem to permit lying under some pre-specified circumstances. In our view, a significant part of such appeals distorts the content and intent of Kant’s arti­cle. The present paper aims to demonstrate the fallaciousness of both lines of reasoning by clarifying what kind of truthfulness (namely, truthfulness in testimony) Kant insists upon in this article, as well as by elucidating the grounds on which he does so. Thus, we maintain that “testimony” is a technical term, which is also confirmed by other Kantian texts (in par­ticular, the Metaphysics of Morals). Moreover, we demonstrate the illegitimacy of appealing to the categorical imperative as justification for the permissibility of lying to a wrongdoer by examining the grounds for its inadmissibility as presented by Kant himself in the article, and by situating them within the broader context presented by the Doctrine of Right and Per­petual Peace.