Moderate Externalities in All-Pay Contests

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Authors: Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela
Cited by: 0

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Abstract

Abstract We study all-pay contests with incomplete information in which, besides the winner's prize, agents are exposed to exogenous identity-dependent externalities. An agent receives a non-positive payoff whenever a specified event occurs, where the loss function is type-dependent and does not need to be synchronized with the winning value. We look at three key specifications: general externalities (every loser suffers), status externalities (one designated opponent outperforms the agent), and second-place externalities (the agent finishes second). Externalities are considered moderate when each type's expected winning payoff exceeds its expected loss, allowing all agents to participate. Under moderate general or status externalities, every type exerts strictly more effort than in the standard all-pay contest. Under moderate second-place externalities, this is no longer true type by type, and we present a necessary and sufficient condition for aggregate effort to increase. These moderate externalities could theoretically be generated by the designer, who could then increase the agents' expected efforts, but unlike other well-known methods, no agent withdraws from the competition.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems

Publication details

Journal / source
Research Square
Publication date
12 November 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint