The Ambition Trap: Why Carbon Taxes Fail in High-corruption Regimes

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Authors: Muhammad Bagus Sistriatmaja, Yogi Pasca Pratama, Muhammad Tawfik Bin Yakuub
Cited by: 0
References: 55

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Abstract

Abstract Global technocratic consensus holds that carbon pricing is the most efficient instrument for climate mitigation. However, its economic viability in institutional environments characterized by systemic rent-seeking remains critically under-explored. While standard Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models typically assume frictionless revenue recycling, this study argues that such assumptions may overestimate the "double dividend" in the Global South. We bridge this theoretical gap by developing a stylized CGE model that endogenizes "institutional leakage" (\(\:{\lambda\:}\)), allowing for a precise simulation of social welfare trajectories under varying degrees of governance inefficiency. Integrating empirical priors on corruption, our simulation identifies a critical tipping point at \(\:{\lambda\:}\approx\:0.35\). Below this threshold, revenue recycling neutralizes price shocks; beyond it, the policy enters an "Ambition Trap." In this regime, the regressive impact of energy prices is exacerbated by "fiscal hemorrhage," leading to a simultaneous contraction in both energy and service sectors. These findings suggest that in high-corruption regimes, institutional reform is not merely complementary but a prerequisite for aggressive climate policy.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Climate Change Policy and Economics Energy Environment and Transportation Policies Economic Growth

Publication details

Journal / source
Research Square
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint