An Analysis of Green Loan Mechanisms Fostering ESG Transition in the Hotel Industry: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model Approach

Abstract Purpose: In response to growing global sustainability demands, this study examines how green loans foster ESG transition in the hotel industry through strategic coordination among government, banks, and hotels. Design/methodology/approach: Grounded in Institutional Theory, this study innovatively introduces a tripartite evolutionary game model to capture bounded-rational decisions under varying policy conditions and embeds RevPAR to reflect operational realities. Numerical simulations across different regulatory intensities (α) and sensitivity analyses are conducted to explore the mechanism through which policy variation shapes green-transition behavior. Findings: The results reveal that α, as a key exogenous factor, exerts a marked nonlinear effect on hotels’ green-transition behavior. Findings also underscore the pivotal role of initial government incentive willingness in shaping institutional outcomes, offering theoretical and practical insights for optimizing green loan mechanisms and regulatory design to advance ESG transition in the hotel sector. Originality/value: This study integrates Institutional Theory with a tripartite evolutionary game model and embeds RevPAR to align theoretical analysis with hotel operational realities. By revealing the nonlinear effect of regulatory intensity (α) and emphasizing the role of initial government incentive willingness, it offers valuable insights for improving green loan mechanisms and regulatory design in the hotel sector.