The Asymmetry of Power: Formalizing Authority Recovery Constraints in Distributed Governance

Abstract The allocation, dispersion, and recovery of authority are central concerns within political science, institutional analysis, and multilevel governance. However, existing literature frequently operates on the implicit assumption of bidirectional recoverability—the notion that institutional authority configurations, once decentralized or fragmented to accommodate complexity, can be linearly restored to a state of centralized authority given sufficient resources and formal authority. This article challenges the assumption of symmetrical elasticity in governance by introducing the Governance Recovery Constraint Model (GRCM). By anchoring the analysis in established domains of structural inertia, path dependence, and institutional resistance, the GRCM formalizes the asymmetric nature of authority recovery in distributed systems. We demonstrate that while the dispersion of decision rights occurs as a functional response to institutional scaling, the subsequent recovery of those rights is inherently non-linear and cost-escalating. The model identifies a Critical Fragmentation Threshold beyond which authority recovery becomes structurally infeasible under ordinary endogenous conditions, transforming distributed governance from a reversible design choice into a durable structural state. We illustrate the model’s dynamics through founder-led organizations as one applied site where concentrated authority, delegation, and recovery constraint become visible within broader distributed governance dynamics.